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Abstract:  
Education is often promoted as the solution to poverty in the developing world. Yet, 
fiscal discipline has led to reductions in public spending on education. We examine 
the poverty impacts of a cut in public subsidies to higher education, accompanied by 
corresponding tax cuts, in a general equilibrium framework applied to Vietnam. This 
policy is shown to have strong and complex impacts through various channels: a 
direct increase in the private costs of higher education, a reduction in education 
investments, a shift in the economy’s skills mix in favor of unskilled workers, a rise in 
the vague premium for skilled workers, education and consumer price changes, etc. 
When all of these contrasting impacts are taken into account, we find that a higher 
education subsidy cut reduces welfare and increases poverty in Vietnam. While rural 
and agricultural households would benefit from this reform, urban and non-
agricultural households would lose out. 
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1 Introduction
Despite a relatively high incidence of poverty (36%), Vietnam has generally succeeded in
providing widespread access to social services such as education and health. However, since
the political and economic reform program (renovation or doi moi) was launched in 1986, the
quantity and quality of public services has been deteriorating and school fees have been in-
troduced in some cases (UNDP (2001)). Presently, Vietnam is still in the heart of this reform
program and has also committed itself to fight poverty. The Vietnamese government is there-
fore facing a big challenge: to promote equity while simultaneously encouraging economic
growth.
Education has the potential to contribute to both of these objectives as a source of human
capital accumulation to spur growth and to allow the poor to escape poverty. Conversely,
reductions in public spending on education seem likely to have strong negative effects by
increasing the cost of education, reducing education investment and increasing the skills pre-
mium, which generally favors the non-poor, in the labor market. Yet, little is known about
the actual impacts, notably taking into account the powerful general equilibrium effects, of
such a widespread policy on education choices, the skilled wage gap and, ultimately, income
distribution. Our goal is to identify the likely winners and losers and poverty impacts of a re-
duction in public spending on education in Vietnam with particular attention to understanding
the mechanisms underlying these impacts.
We choose to focus our analysis on education as an investment, as described in human
capital theory, and to neglect, at this stage, the direct utility provided by education as a con-
sumption good1. Human capital theory, developed by Schultz (1961, 1971) and Becker (1975),
1We neglect the consumption motive despite the fact that it can also be a plausible, but partial, explanation of
education demand. This view states that, in addition to the investment motive, education provides utility in itself
stipulates that education and training contribute to the creation of human capital, or labor pro-
ductivity, just as investment in technology increases physical capital productivity. Individual
benefits from education take the form of higher remuneration, whereas social benefits materi-
alize as a higher growth rate. Consequently, modeling of education requires the specification
of two production functions: a production function for final goods, in which human capital is
a crucial input, and a production function for human capital.
A first specification for the production of final goods, going back to Lucas (1988), as-
sumes that production is a function of physical capital and aggregated “efficient labor units”
(h) possessed more or less abundantly by workers in the economy. Education contributes to
the accumulation of h where each unit of h is remunerated at a same rate. A second spec-
ification2 assumes distinct categories of workers having different skill levels and receiving
different wages. Production is thus a function of capital and of these types of labor3. Ed-
ucation generally allows workers to “migrate” from one category to another by attaining a
certain predetermined training level4. This type of specification has the advantage of allowing
analysis of wage distribution since remuneration of each labor category depends on its relative
scarcity.
Production of the “human capital” output depends on the different inputs intervening in the
production process of skills. Among them are individual effort or time invested in education5,
(eg: general knowledge, increased leisure value, etc.). Like all other consumer goods, its demand then depends
on its own price (including direct and indirect costs), the prices of all other goods and household income. See,
for example, Kodde and Ritzen (1984) and Belfield (2000).
2See, for example, Cahuc and Michel (1993, 1996) as well as Heckman et al. (1999)
3According to Chiswick and Chiswick (1987), empirical evidence supports the adoption of a constant elas-
ticity of substitution (CES) function.
4The role of education is modeled differently in Jacobs (2007). Education allows two different types of
agents (high ability and low ability) to accumulate human capital at different rates, the high ability type having
a comparative advantage in learning. Moreover, due to imperfect substitution in labor demand, units of human
capital are remunerated at the type-specific wage rate.
5See Heckman et al. (1999), Glomm and Ravikumar (2001), Docquier and Michel (1999), Asselin (1996).
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initial human capital level and public spending in this sector6. Time spent at school has an
opportunity cost, which is generally represented as foregone labor earnings, except in the case
of Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) who consider it as a leisure loss. Demand for education is
therefore an investment decision involving a trade-off between the costs (opportunity costs,
school fees, the cost of school material and uniforms or clothing, transport, additional living
expenses if schooling implies living away from home, etc.) and benefits (in terms of higher
future wages) of an additional year of study.
Two of the most frequently used partial equilibrium analysis of public policies impacts are
benefit incidence analysis and behavioral approaches. Benefit incidence analysis7 assumes
that benefits to the consumer of a public service is equivalent to the cost per user of furnishing
this service. These benefits are assigned to users ordered according to some welfare measure,
which makes it possible to evaluate whether they are progressive or regressive. Although this
technique is widely used, criticisms are also numerous. There are strong reasons to believe that
public spending is not distributed evenly and does not benefit each user to the same degree.
Moreover, this approach does not take account of individual reactions to policy changes.
Behavioral approaches, developed by Gertler et al. (1987) and many others, analyze
changes in policies over time or in space to econometrically estimate the effects of public
spending on monetary and non-monetary welfare measures while controlling for other fac-
tors likely to influence these measures. They find that beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
significantly adapt many aspects of their behavior to changes in public spending. But these
approaches are limited by probable estimation biases resulting from endogeneity and omitted
6In a dynamic context, authors also account for the depreciation rate of human capital (Lucas (1988)) repre-
senting obsolescence of knowledge.
7This methodology, initially proposed by Meerman (1979) and Selowsky (1979), is described in detail in Van
de Walle (1996).
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variables8.
Furthermore, we believe that education policies have important general equilibrium im-
pacts, in particular through their impacts on relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers,
which have clear poverty implications. For this reason, partial equilibrium analysis does not
adequately reflect the magnitude and even the direction of actual impacts. In order to be able
to capture these effects, Heckman et al. (1999) suggest a general equilibrium analysis. In this
study, a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is proposed9.
There are only a handful of existing CGE studies linking education policies and households
welfare, poverty, or inequality level. Savard and Adjovi (1998) introduces externalities from
public spending on education in a static model while Lofgren and Robinson (2004) specifies
the impact of government spending on total factor productivity growth in a recursive model.
In both papers, there are no attempt to model household investment or consumption behavior
with respect to education, nor the resulting impacts on the labor market. The policy impact on
households is thus only indirectly channelled via the production level in the economy.
A more elaborate approach is adopted by Agénor et al. (2002), Agénor et al. (2004),
Bourguignon et al. (2004), and Logfren and Diaz-Bonilla (2006). It incorporates the impacts
of education on the relative supply of skilled and unskilled workers in the economy and, as
a consequence, on the wage premium. However, households are not allowed to modify their
endowments in the different type of labor as a result of getting education, which seriously
limits the impact of policy reforms on the labor markets and the analysis of the distributive
effects of education on households. Furthermore, the skill acquisition function does not follow
8Endogeneity would cause problems in cases where the design of a public program was based, in part, on the
welfare measure used for analysis. Omitted variable bias would occur if a variable, which is not included in the
regression, is correlated with both the design of the public policy and with the welfare measure.
9For a description of the essential features of CGE models, see Decaluwé and Martens (1988) or Shoven and
Whalley (1984).
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from an explicit modelling of household behavior, nor does it reflect human capital theory.
In a recursive dynamic CGE model where the labor market is segmented into skilled and
unskilled workers, Agénor et al. (2002) impose an ad hoc skill acquisition function that de-
pends on the relative expected wages of skilled and unskilled workers, government capital
stock in the education sector, and the average level of wealth of each unskilled worker. Only
urban workers have the possibility to acquire skills. Consequently, any simulation of a change
in the amount of public capital in education has only an indirect impact (through urban-rural
migration) on rural households10. Acquiring skills does not allow a household to change its
labor supply composition.
Agénor et al. (2004) also develop a recursive macroeconomic framework. In each pe-
riod, raw labor can be transformed into educated labor through a production function that is
assumed to depend on the quantity of raw labor and the stock of public capital in education
in the previous period. Interestingly, this function accounts for a congestion effect. There is
only one aggregate household and thus the change in the labor composition in the economy
is also the change in the labor composition of the aggregate household. Modifications in this
aggregate household’s consumption and price level are applied to a household survey (using
an estimated partial elasticity) to analyze poverty effects.
In a different spirit, Bourguignon et al. (2004) developed an economy wide model to
capture the relationship between several of the Millenium Development Goal (MDG) objec-
tives. An implementation of this approach is provided by Logfren and Diaz-Bonilla (2006)
for Ethiopia. They endogenize some aspects of student behavior. For example, the drop out,
10Even if it is an established fact that a majority of education institutions are located in urban areas, it would
be false to pretend that none exists in rural areas. Furthermore, since a student who lives in a rented room and
studies in urban areas during the week can still be considered part of a rural household, to require migration as a
prerequisite for education could lead to false conclusions.
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repeat and graduation rates are all linked to several indicators: quality of education, wage in-
centives, the mortality rate, the size of the infrastructure capital stock, etc. Even if they fail
to develop a rigorous theoretical framework justifying their formulation of student behavior,
this approach is very interesting and offers the advantage of linking the performance of the
education system to the labor market with a possible feedback impact on wage differentials
and household income.
Although they also do not allow households to modify the composition of their labor en-
dowment, Jung and Thorbecke (2001) and Dabla-Morris and Matovu (2002) improve on the
previous group of papers by using a production function of human capital based on explicit
household optimization.
In a sequential dynamic CGE model for Tanzania and Zambia, Jung and Thorbecke (2001)
consider three types of labor differentiated by skills. They specify a constant return to scale
production function of skilled labor that depends on public expenditures in education and the
opportunity cost of acquiring more skills. This opportunity cost is defined as the effort pro-
vided (or time invested) in education by the household multiplied by the wage it would obtain
if it chose not to invest in further education. Households choose the effort level through the
maximization of the present value of their income while taking into account wage differentials
(present or expected), the unemployment rate and the interest rate. As mentioned previously,
the model still has one important drawback: the proportion of household endowments in the
different labor categories is constant, precluding any behavioral response11.
Dabla-Morris and Matovu (2002) construct a dynamic CGE with overlapping generations
and heterogeneous agents for Ghana in which the modeling of the household decision is ex-
11Households can decide to get more education and this contributes to increase the quantity of skilled work-
ers in households and in the economy in general. However, the endowment in skilled labor rises in the same
proportion in all household groups. Thus, highly educated households will always remain the most educated.
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tremely rigorous and closely related to human capital theory. All households value family
consumption and the human capital of their offspring. Altruistic parents choose the time their
child spends in school based on a careful cost-benefit analysis. On one hand, schooling in-
creases the child’s human capital and future earnings on the labor market, as well as the utility
of the (altruistic) parent. On the other hand, given fixed and variable costs for different levels
of education, schooling lowers household income, and thus consumption. The scale of the
benefits from education depends on school quality and child ability. The fraction of the pop-
ulation falling in 17 different skill-types is endogenized by taking into account household
schooling decisions in each period. The model has nonetheless two important limitations in
relation to poverty analysis. First, household groups are only differentiated by their level
of human capital (parents’ and child’s combined), which implies that it is impossible to see
if some unrelated (to education) characteristics of the households explain skill acquisition
behavior and only aggregate poverty measures can be analyzed. Second, there is only one
representative firm and thus only a single aggregate demand for labor – instead of sectoral
labor demands differing according to the sectoral intensities in the different types of labor –
influences the wage premium. This is an important weakness in that poverty effects are gen-
erally driven primarily through the income channel, which is mediated by household factor
endowments and sectoral factor demands.
Finally, Zhai and Hertel (2006) developed an economywide model for China where ed-
ucation expenditure affects the production of human capital, its distribution among different
household groups and the skill composition of each household. Each household is endowed
with different categories of workers distinguished by their total years of schooling. Education
results in a greater supply of skilled labor and lesser supply of unskilled labor and in an im-
proved mobility of labor in rural areas. Simultaneously for each skill level, more education
yields, in a linearly increasing manner, an improvement in labor productivity. Nevertheless,
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the authors assume that private and public expenditures in education are made in equal pro-
portions and thus private decisions regarding skill acquisition are not the result of household
investment choices.
To our knowledge, no authors have analyzed the impact of public expenditures in educa-
tion using a CGE model that incorporates: 1) a relative supply of skilled and unskilled labor,
and a wage differential, that are endogenous to the level of schooling; 2) several household
groups with differential endowments in multiple labor types and thus a differentiated impact
of education on the composition of these household labor endowments; 3) a production func-
tion for skills or human capital that is endogenously derived from household (investment)
optimization relating to education.
In order to capture the general equilibrium effects on income distribution of changes in
education policies in Vietnam, we develop a static CGE model that incorporates all three
above-mentioned elements. Household education investment decisions are modeled in detail.
The model accounts for direct and opportunity costs of education as well as public spending
on education. It renders household endowments of skilled and unskilled workers endogenous
in the spirit of human capital theory. A simulation is run in order to analyze the impacts of
a reduction in public spending on education on the Vietnamese economy and, in particular,
on poverty. In a more general manner, we aim to reach a better global understanding of the
link between public spending in education and poverty in order to be able to learn lessons
transferable to other countries. Furthermore, through the innovative integration of education
in this model, this paper contributes to poverty and income distribution analysis.
In the next section, the theoretical model used is described with emphasis on how edu-
cation and related household decisions are integrated into the CGE framework. Section 3
presents an analysis of the distributive consequences of a simulated reduction in public spend-
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ing on education. We conclude and put our results in perspective in section 4.
2 The Model
The general structure of the model is based on an archetypal static CGE model designed by
Cockburn et al. (2007). The Vietnamese economy is represented as a small open economy,
i.e. taking international prices as given. The model includes five production sectors (agri-
culture, industry, services, low and high education), two labor categories or education levels
(skilled and unskilled)12 and four household groups (rural agricultural, rural non agricultural,
urban agricultural13 and urban non agricultural). Disaggregation of representative households
into more than one category allows us to observe the distinct way in which each of them are
affected by the shock and, consequently, to analyze welfare and poverty impacts14.
The proposed model allows adjustments in household skilled and unskilled labor endow-
ments meaning that they are specific to each category of households. Household decisions
concerning education follow a pure investment motive and are modeled in a relatively simple
manner. In order to maximize their income, households modify the equilibrium proportion
of skilled and unskilled labor that they possess by adjusting their equilibrium level of educa-
tion investment. Note that the model determines an equilibrium flow of education investments
and amount of time devoted to education that is required to maintain an optimal mix in the
household’s stock of skilled and unskilled workers. So, by reducing its equilibrium education
investments, the household would reduce the share of skilled workers in its equilibrium labor
12We choose to consider two distinct labor categories instead of a continuum of human capital levels à la
Lucas (1988) in order to have two different wages (see section 1) influencing household decisions.
13This category is composed of agricultural workers who live in the outside edges of cities and work in proxi-
mate fields.
14The analysis must however be limited to intergroup comparison. It is a recognized weakness since the
model supposes stability of income distribution within each household category. A solution to this problem
would necessitate microsimulation techniques (see Cockburn (2001)), which go beyond the scope of this paper.
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endowment. Education investment decisions then influence household income and consump-
tion, as well as total production in the economy,
which is a function of human capital (see section 2.4). Household demand for educa-
tion depends on the relative wages of skilled and unskilled workers, the opportunity cost of
schooling, as well as the direct cost of education.
The Vietnamese education system includes five levels: a) preschool; b) primary; c) lower
secondary; d) upper secondary; and e) post-secondary education. There is also a parallel
system of professional education offered by various institutions and accessible after primary
or lower secondary school. The education system in our model is segmented in two: basic
education (a and b) and higher education (c, d, e, and professional training). Only higher
education allows workers to become skilled. Instead of specifying a production function for
human capital (see section 1), we assume that households must buy or “consume”15 a predeter-
mined amount of higher education units in order to possess more skilled labor. All education
is assumed to be public, as semi-public and private schools remain quite rare in Vietnam. The
value of education produced and consumed is partly paid by the government (public spending
on education) and partly paid by households (direct cost of education).
In order to simplify the presentation, we do not present all model equations16. Emphasis
will be put on equations introduced in order to model education.
15
“Consumption of education” refers to the action of buying units of schooling and thus investing in education.
16The complete list of equations is available in annexe 1.
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2.1 Households
In typical static CGE models (without education), each household possesses fixed endowments
of skilled and unskilled labor, capital and land17. Household income is composed of returns on
factors of production (labor, capital and land) and transfers (governmental or others). House-
holds thus have no control over their income. Consumption choices in order to maximize
utility are the only household decisions to be modeled. In some cases, an endogenous labor
supply equation is also included to introduce a labor-leisure trade off.
As education investments are taken into account in our model, households makes an ad-
ditional decision: the proportion of its adult members in each labor category (skilled and un-
skilled). Households can modify their shares of skilled and unskilled labor by changing their
level of higher education investments. Investment in basic education is assumed to be fixed18.
The household decision is therefore modeled in two stages19: (i) Income maximization; (ii)
Utility maximization.
2.1.1 Income maximization
As education investments only affect utility through their impacts on net income (Y Hh),
household h chooses the volume of skilled (LS) and unskilled (LU ) labor in order to max-
imize income (net of spending on education), subject to imperfect transformation between
skilled and unskilled labor. The total number of workers and students in each household h
17In recursive dynamic CGE models, endowments generally increase at an exogenous given rate, generally
equal to the population growth rate. However, except in the MAMS framework discussed in section 1, there is
no relationship between education and accumulation of skilled labor.
18Since attendance rates in primary school in Vietnam are more than 90% (Nguyen (2002)), it is reasonable to
treat this as an exogenous variable. In other contexts, the model could be easily modified to allow endogenous
basic education investments.
19Household decisions concerning education and consumption are assumed “separable” as in Heckman et al.
(1999), Bouzahzah et al. (2002).
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being fixed in the short term, this can also be understood as a choice of the optimal shares of
skilled and unskilled workers.
This total number of workers and students is not directly observed, but the initial value
of remunerated labor is. Estimates from the literature of the returns to higher education can
then be used to estimate the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Hence, the
constrained maximization of net income can be expressed as
max
δs
h
Y Hh = Wu (1− δ
s
h) Lh +Ws (1− e) δ
s
h Lh − Pcedh CEDh, edh e δ
s
h Lh
+ non labor income − cost of basic education (1)
s.t. Lh = blh
{
βlh
[
(1− δsh) Lh
]κl
+ (1− βlh)
[
δsh Lh
]κl}1/κl
, (2)
where δsh is the share of skilled workers in household h’s total potential labor supply (including
students), e is the share of active life that must be devoted to higher education by a skilled
worker, βlh is the CET share parameter reflecting the household-specific shares of unskilled
labor, blh is the CET scale parameter and κl is a parameter of transformation between skilled
and unskilled labor.
In equation 1, income from unskilled labor is represented by Wu (1 − δsh) Lh, i.e. the
product of the unskilled wage index (Wu) and the volume of unskilled labor in the household.
Similarly, income from skilled labor, Ws (1−e) δshLh is the product of the skilled wage index
(Ws), the volume of skilled labor in the household, and the proportion of a skilled worker’s
active life not spent in higher education (1− e).
The volume of remunerated (active) skilled workers is represented by (1 − e) δsh Lh and
the volume of higher education students is e δsh Lh. This specification implies a long-term
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equilibrium where a household must, year after year, have e% of its skilled workers in higher
education in order to maintain its desired proportion (δsh) of skilled labor. In other words,
to increase its endowments in skilled labor by ∆δsh, household h must increase the number
of units of higher education it “consumes” by e ∆δsh Lh and, at the same time, increase the
amount of time it invests in higher education. This situation implies that the opportunity cost
of education is Ws e δsh Lh.
Household net income also depends on the amount that households spend on their invest-
ment in higher education: Pcedh CEDh, edh e δsh Lh. Higher education has a fixed direct unit
cost (including school fees, transportation, materials, etc.), CEDT h, edh, that varies between
household groups (e.g. costs may be higher in rural areas because of greater transportation
costs)20. Part of this total cost is paid by an exogenous public subsidy (TEDedh), which is
assumed to be the same for all households. The direct unit cost to households of higher educa-
tion, CEDh, edh, represents the difference between the total unit cost and the public subsidy:
CEDh, edh = CEDT h, edh − TEDedh (3)
Consequently, a reduction (increase) in the public subsidy leads to an increase (decrease) in
the private direct unit cost of higher education (CEDh, edh). Education costs are indexed by
the price of higher education, Pcedh, which captures changes in the production costs of higher
education and changes in the demand for higher education.
The imperfect substitution between skilled and unskilled labor (equation 2) also plays an
essential role in modeling education investments. Without this constraint, households would
specialize entirely in one or the other type of labor. The ease with which households can
change their skill mix (see equation 4) depends on the transformation parameter κl from the
20Unit costs are equal to total costs divided by the corresponding volume of students, i.e. the total number of
students multiplied by the average skilled wage rate in the base year.
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(CET) function21.
When choosing its share of skilled labor (δsh), the household analyzes the trade off between
the benefits of possessing more educated labor (higher wage rate) and the opportunity and di-
rect costs of higher education. The choice function resulting from labor income maximisation
is:
δsh
(1− δsh)
=
( net gain︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ws
Wu︸ ︷︷ ︸
skills premium
−
e Ws
Wu︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity cost
−
Pcedh CEDh, edh e
Wu︸ ︷︷ ︸
direct cost and price of education
)τ l[
βlh
1− βlh
]τ l
(4)
So, if the benefits of possessing more skilled labor (the skill wage premium) exceed the total
(opportunity and direct) cost of education, we would expect households to increase their share
of skilled labor through increase investments in education. If the benefits are inferior to the
costs, households would reduce their share of skilled labor and education investments. The ex-
tent of their reactions will depend on their initial skills mix and the elasticity of transformation
between skilled and unskilled labor τ l = 1/(κl − 1).
Once the optimal share of skilled labor (δsh) is determined, the household supplies (1 −
δsh) Lh of unskilled labor and (1− e) δsh Lh of skilled labor, while the rest of the skilled labor,
e δsh Lh, attends higher education. When public spending on education falls, if all households
decide to reduce their investment in higher education, there would be, on the one hand, an
increase in the supply of unskilled labor supply of ∆δsh and a decrease in the supply of skilled
labor of ∆(1− e) δsh so that total labor supply would increase by ∆e δsh.
21The value for κl was chosen to be 1.5. Sensitivity analysis reveals that values between 0.5 and 10 do not
change the direction of results and only slightly affect their amplitude. Parameters, bl
h
and βl
h
, are calibrated on
Vietnamese data (see section 2.7).
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2.1.2 Utility maximization
Having determined their optimal labor skill mix, households then choose their consumption
of all goods (other than basic and higher education, which do not provide any direct utility to
households22) in order to maximize their utility subject to the budget constraint resulting from
income maximization. A “Stone-Geary” utility function is adopted, giving rise to a linear
demand system.
2.2 Government
Government behavior is relatively simple. Its income comes from taxes and from transfers
from the rest of the world. Government allocates this income between spending on public
services (education and others), transfers to households and firms, and savings23. Education
in Vietnam represents 15% of public spending, of which a little more than half is allocated to
higher education (57.3%).
Public spending on higher education is endogenous, as it depends on household demand
for higher education. In effect, the government subsidizes a fixed amount for each unit of
higher education “consumed” by households. Public spending on higher education (Gedh) is
thus defined as follows:
Pcedh Gedh = Pcedh TEDedh
∑
h
e δsh Lh (5)
Public spending on education therefore reduces the direct cost of higher education and thus
provides households with incentives to invest further. Basic education is also publicly subsi-
22Integration of leisure and a direct impact on utility of education in this model would be interesting exten-
sions. If education directly generated utility, education and leisure would become substitutes and time would be
allocated between labor, leisure and education.
23Savings are negative in the case of a budget deficit.
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dized but, since demand by households is assumed to be fixed, the volume of public spending
on basic education is also exogenous.
In order to maintain public savings (current budget surplus) fixed during our simulations,
government income and consumption (other than spending on higher education) are fixed and
the sales tax, which influences consumption prices, is allowed to adjust endogenously.
2.3 Factors of Production
There are three production factors: capital, land and labor. Land is sector-specific (immobile)
and exclusive to agriculture. Because our central focus, education, is a long term phenomenon,
capital is assumed to be mobile among sectors, which implies that there is a single rate of
return on capital for all sectors in the economy.
Labor is segmented between unskilled labor (not having completed lower secondary) and
skilled labor (having completed at least lower secondary). Workers are assumed to be mobile
among sectors of activity so that wage rates are the same in all sectors for a given skill cate-
gory. The skills premium is determined by changes in the demand for each category of labor
and their respective supplies. As we have seen, the supply of skilled and unskilled labor is
determined by household education investment decisions. So, a fall in the relative supply of
skilled labor is expected to lead to an increase in the skills premium.
2.4 Production
All sectors are assumed to use a constant returns technology under perfect competition. Output
is a Leontief combination of value-added and intermediate consumption, while value-added is
a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function of composite labor and capital. Composite
16
labor is itself a CES function of skilled and unskilled labor. Under these conditions, it is clear
that changes in public spending on education will influence value added and total output in the
economy through its impacts on the share of skilled and unskilled labor supply, as well as the
corresponding changes in the share of (inactive) students in higher education.
2.5 Equilibrium and closure conditions
Equilibrium in each market is reached through price adjustments. Wages are the equilibrating
variables on the labor market as specified in section 2.3. The public deficit and current ac-
count balance are maintained fixed through endogenous variations of the sales tax rate and the
general price index.
The last constraint concerns the savings-investment equilibrium. Real investment (volume)
is fixed and financed by the savings of households, firms, government (public surplus), and
the rest of the world (current account balance). Equilibrium is attained through endogenous
variation in firm savings.
2.6 Welfare and Poverty Effects
Equivalent variations (EV) are used to measure welfare impacts. Education influences house-
hold welfare through its impacts on net (of spending on higher education) income and con-
sumer prices.
Poverty analysis requires observations of expenditures at the household level. Base year
values are obtained from a representative household survey discussed below. After the simula-
tions, changes in net income24 of the different household groups in the CGE model are applied
24These changes are equivalent to the variations in total expenditures since average savings and income tax
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to all households in corresponding groups.
We use two absolute poverty lines: one for urban households and
the other for rural households. They represent the real cost of a basket of goods deemed
necessary for a minimal quality of life25 in both areas. When running simulations, the con-
sumer price indices (CPI) of rural and urban households evolve differently according to their
respective consumption patterns. These variations in the CPI of rural and urban households are
applied to their respective poverty lines, which means that the poverty lines are endogenous26.
Poverty is measured by the standard FGT indices (Foster et al. (1984)). Initial FGT poverty
indices are calculated using base-year total consumption per capita for each household. The
new FGT indices are then calculated using the new poverty lines and levels of total consump-
tion per capita. Finally, FGT indices are compared before and after the simulations. Gini
indices, computed using DAD software (Duclos et al. (2001) and Duclos and Araar (2006))
are compared in the same manner.
2.7 Data
Calibration of our model is based on a year 2000 SAM for Vietnam constructed by Tarp et al.
(2002). Poverty analysis is based on data from the 1997-98 Vietnam Living Standard Survey
(VLSS) of more than 6000 households (Government Statistical Office (2000)). Rural, urban
and nationwide poverty lines were calculated so as to reproduce official poverty headcounts.
The nationwide poverty line that satisfies this criterion is 1,877,000, which is close to the
official poverty line of 1,789,871 Vietnam Dong (around 120$US) per person computed by the
rates are fixed.
25A minimum consumption of 2100 calories per day and per person, plus a minimum non-food consumption
(accommodation, clothing, etc.) allowance is assumed.
26See Decaluwé et al. (1999, 2005).
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Government Statistical Office (GSO) of Vietnam in collaboration with the World Bank (Viet
Nam’s Government-Donor-NGO (1999), Australian Agency for International Development
(2002)).
The ratio of skilled to unskilled wage indices captures the initial returns to education.
In this model, this must be somewhere between the returns to completing lower secondary
school and the returns to completing university, i.e. between 7% and 94% based on a Mincer
equation analysis (Mincer (1988)) performed by Nguyen (2002). A return to education of
25% is assumed. We normalize Ws at unity and thus Wu equals 0.8.
The value of governmental and household expenditures on higher education are obtained
from the SAM. Given that a skilled worker must spend 15% of her/his active life in higher
education27, the volume of students in higher education at any given time is, on average, 15%
(the parameter “e” in our model) of the volume of skilled workers in each household group.
The public (unit) subsidy is equal to total public spending on higher education divided by the
volume of students. Private unit costs are specific to each household category and equal to
their reported private spending on higher education divided by the volume of students in this
category. The total unit cost of education is the sum of these two.
3 Results
We simulate the impacts on household welfare and poverty in Vietnam of a 50% reduction
in the public subsidy for higher education28. If behavior were to stay unchanged, this would
lead to a 50% decrease in public spending on higher education. However, as we will see that
27Average 8 years for higher education / 53 years of active adult life between beginning higher education at
age 11 and retiring on average at age 64.
28 The simulation can also be interpreted as the introduction of, or the increase in, user (tuition) fees.
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households respond by reducing their demand for higher education, public spending falls even
more.
As illustrated in figure 1, the impacts of this policy change on household welfare, poverty
and inequality are complex with important general equilibrium effects that are missing in stan-
dard benefit incidence analysis. We focus on the education investment decision, households
income, and the poverty impacts.
3.1 Impacts on education investments and the skills mix
Education investments are governed by equation 4 with four main channels of impact.
“Direct cost” effect (I): Following equation 3, a 50% reduction in the public subsidy (TEDedh)
increases the private direct cost per unit of higher education (CEDh, edh) by the same
amount for each student. This directly reduces the net gain to education investments in
equation 4. The fall in education investments then sets in motion general equilibrium
effects that feed back into the other three channels of impact.
“Skills premium” effect (II): Households respond to the increase in private direct costs by
decreasing their investment in higher education, which in turn reduces their supply of
skilled labor and time spent in higher education. Since the total labor endowment of
households is fixed, there is a commensurate increase in their supply of unskilled labor.
The resulting fall in the supply of skilled labor and rise in the supply of unskilled labor
in the economy leads to an increase in the skill wage premium. This increases the net
gain of higher education, somewhat offsetting the “direct cost” effect.
“Opportunity cost” effect (III): The increase in the skills premium simultaneously raises
the opportunity cost of higher education. This cost increases proportionately less than
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Figure 1: Welfare, poverty and inequality impacts of a reduction in public spending on educa-
tion
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the skills premium as the share of active life spent in higher education (e) is necessarily
less than one, but its impact is to reduce net gains to higher education, further reinforcing
the “direct cost” effect.
“Price of education” effect (IV): A fourth channel of impact on the net gain in equation 4 is
the price of higher education. This can be expected to change as a result of the compen-
satory sales tax, the above-mentioned changes in wage rates, the fall in the demand for
higher education, as well as other general equilibrium supply and demand effects. The
direction of this impact is hard to predict a priori.
Note that all other general equilibrium effects are also taken into account in the model and
the final results we obtain. For example, reduced spending on education subsidies allow the
government to also reduce sales taxes, which brings down consumer prices. However, these
are second order effects that are not of direct interest to our analysis.
We first examine the overall simulation results (“All” column in table 1), before examining
how specific household groups are affected. The public subsidy is cut 50% from 0.78 (block
A of table 1) to 0.39 (block B). As total unit costs are assumed to be fixed, the private unit cost
thus increases by the same absolute amount, going from 0.76 (block A) to 1.15 (block B). This
results in an increase of 0.06 in the direct cost of education element in equation 4 (an increase
from 0.11 to 0.17, see block C and D). Our results also indicate that the subsidy cut leads to
a small increase in both the skills premium and opportunity cost components of the net gains
from education. This is due to the fact that households reduce their education investments and,
consequently, their supply of skilled labor (compare blocks E and F), as we will see shortly.
Finally, the price of higher education increases very slightly (0.02%). The “price of education
effect” is integrated into the direct cost results in table 1, as the two impacts are multiplicative
and cannot be separated. The net impact of these four channels is a 4.2 percent reduction in the
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net gain from education (block D), as the increase in direct and opportunity costs outweigh the
increase in the skills premium. Note that a partial equilibrium analysis would have overstated
the impact on net gains by roughly 100% by capturing only the 0.06 increase in direct costs
and neglecting the countervailing impact of the increase in the skills premium. Households
react to the fall in net gains by reducing their education investments, which translates into a
4.01% reduction in the volume of both students and skilled labor, as well as a 1.27% increase
in the supply of unskilled labor (block F). The reduction in the volume of students leads to a
0.15% increase in the total labor supply in the economy. On the factor market, the fall in the
relative supply of skilled versus unskilled workers leads to a decrease in the unskilled wage
rate of 0.32% and an increase in skilled wage rate of 3.30% (not shown).
Our results also indicate that the impacts of the subsidy cut on education investments differ
between household groups. Although all household groups experience the same 0.03 absolute
increase in net gains 29, it is the percentage change in net gains that drive household decisions
on their optimal skills mix (equation 4). Percentage net gain variations differ according to
the initial levels of these gains for each household group. The percentage fall in net gains are
greatest for rural and agricultural households which, due to their higher initial direct education
costs, have a lower initial level of net gains from higher education. Greater travel costs in rural
and agricultural areas are one possible explanation for their higher unit costs of education 30.
29We assume that all household groups experience the same subsidy cut of 0.39 and thus all share the same
absolute increase of 0.06 in the direct cost of education component of net gains. Furthermore, the skills premium
and opportunity costs components are identical, as all household groups face the same wage rates and have the
same share of active life required for higher education (blocks C and D).
30Although this is a simplifying assumption, relaxing it would only increase the disadvantage of rural and
agricultural households. Nguyen (2002) reports higher per student public spending in urban and non agricultural
areas such as the Red River delta (Hanoi) and the south east (Saigon), particularly for upper secondary school. To
take this fact into account, we would have had to attribute lower public subsidies per student to rural households.
Thus, the private cost share of those households would have been even higher and the reduction in their net gain
to education would also have been greater.
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Table 1: Structure and impacts on education and labor
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Share of population 76.0 58.8 17.2 24.1 2.9 21.1 100.0
A) Higher education costs: Base
Private unit cost 1.26 1.53 0.94 0.54 1.49 0.51 0.76
Public subsidy 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78
Total unit cost 2.04 2.32 1.73 1.32 2.27 1.29 1.54
Private cost share 61.58 66.14 54.56 40.66 65.51 39.23 49.22
B) Higher education costs: After simulation
Private unit cost 1.65 1.92 1.33 0.93 1.88 0.90 1.15
Public subsidy 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39
Total unit cost 2.04 2.32 1.73 1.32 2.27 1.29 1.54
Private cost share 80.77 83.07 77.28 70.31 82.76 69.61 74.53
C) Benefits and costs of higher education: Base
Skill premium 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
Opportunity cost 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187
Direct cost 0.24 0.29 0.18 0.10 0.28 0.10 0.14
Net gain 0.83 0.78 0.89 0.96 0.78 0.97 0.92
D) Benefits and costs of higher education: After simulation
Skill premium 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.30
Opportunity cost 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194
Direct cost 0.31 0.36 0.25 0.18 0.35 0.17 0.22
Net gain 0.79 0.74 0.85 0.93 0.75 0.93 0.89
∆ Net gain -4.32 -4.66 -4.03 -4.08 -4.61 -3.66 -4.20
E) Distribution of labor within households: Base (%)
Unskilled labor 87.25 89.25 83.79 60.00 87.76 56.79 75.92
Skilled labor 10.84 9.14 13.78 34.00 10.40 36.73 20.47
Total labor 98.09 98.39 97.57 94.00 98.16 93.52 96.39
Students 1.91 1.61 2.43 6.00 1.84 6.48 3.61
F) Distribution of labor within households: Percentage change (%)
∆ Unskilled labor 0.83 0.75 0.98 2.17 0.84 2.41 1.27
∆ Skilled labor -5.67 -6.21 -5.06 -3.26 -6.04 -3.17 -4.01
∆ Total labor 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.21 0.11 0.22 0.15
∆ Students -5.67 -6.21 -5.06 -3.26 -6.04 -3.17 -4.01
Notes: The specifications for “skills premium”, “opportunity cost”, “direct cost” and “net gain” are
provided by equation 4.
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In addition to the percentage change in net gains, the percentage impacts on the optimal
skills mix and consequent education investments of each household group depend on the initial
skills mix, as reflected in the parameter βlh (equation 4). The lower the initial share of skilled
labor, the greater the percentage increase in skilled labor supply and students and the smaller
the percentage decrease in unskilled labor supply. As it is the rural and agricultural households
that have the lowest initial shares of skilled labor – as well as the greatest percentage reduction
in net gains from higher education – they also have the largest percentage increase in skilled
labor and the smallest percentage fall in unskilled labor supply (block F). In contrast, urban
and non-agricultural households post the smallest percentage fall in skilled labor supply and
students (education investments).
We thus conclude that a subsidy cut would reduce the net gains from higher education.
This would lead to a shift in Vietnam’s skills mix in favor of unskilled workers, which would
further accentuate the wage gap in favor of skilled workers. Rural and agricultural households
post the greatest percentage reductions in the net gains from higher education and in skilled
labor supply, but the smallest percentage change in unskilled labor supply.
3.2 Impacts on household incomes
Our ultimate concern is the impact of the higher education subsidy cut on income distribution
and poverty. To understand these impacts, we must first study the household income and
consumer price effects. Here, we can identify six main channels of influence, of which the
first five involve household net income, whereas the final one concerns consumer prices: skills
mix, wage rates, cost of higher education, non-labor income, cost of basic education, and
consumer prices (other than education).
To first trace out the five income channels, let us approximately decompose the change in
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net income by taking the total differential of equation 1:
∆Y Hh ≈ [Ws (1− e) − Wu] ∆δsh Lh
}
Skills mix effect
+∆Wu (1− δsh) Lh +∆Ws (1− e) δ
s
h Lh
}
Wage effect (6)
−∆Pcedh CEDh, edh δ
s
h eLh
−Pcedh ∆CEDh, edh δ
s
h e Lh
−Pcedh CEDh, edh ∆δ
s
h e Lh


Cost of higher education effect
+∆ non labor income −∆ cost of basic education.
Percentage changes in net income components are reported in table 2. We discuss each
effect separately.
Skills mix (V): As noted in the preceding section, the net impact of the cuts in public subsi-
dies is a reduction in the net gains from and, consequently, the investments in higher
education. At the new equilibrium, this results in a shift in the household optimal
skills mix in favor of unskilled workers relative to skilled workers and students (i.e.
a reduction in δsh). The impact of this skills mix shift on household income depends
crucially on the share of time spent in higher education (e, which we assume to be
15% of active life31) and the gap between skilled and unskilled wage rates (Ws−Wu,
which we assume to be 20%). We can rewrite the expression for the skills mix ef-
fect as: [(1 − e)(Ws − Wu) − e Wu] ∆δsh Lh. On one hand, a reduction in the
share of skilled workers reduces household income by the amount of the wage premium
(Ws−Wu = 1− 0.8 = 20%) that these workers would have earned over their working
life (1− e). On the other hand, household income is increased by the (unskilled) wages
these workers earn during the share of their active life (e = 15%) that they would have
31See section 2.7.
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Table 2: Income channels
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Skill mix effects
(1− e)(Ws − Wu) ∆δsh Lh -0.10 -0.09 -0.13 -0.17 -0.11 -0.18 -0.13
(−e)Wu∆δsh Lh 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.13 0.09
Wage effect
∆Wu (1− δsh) Lh -0.19 -0.18 -0.20 -0.12 -0.20 -0.11 -0.16
∆Ws (1− e) δsh Lh 0.30 0.24 0.41 0.88 0.30 0.94 0.55
Total 0.11 0.06 0.22 0.76 0.10 0.82 0.39
Cost of higher education effect
−∆ Pcedh CEDh, edh e δ
s
h Lh -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
−Pcedh ∆ CEDh, edh e δ
s
h Lh -0.62 -0.50 -0.87 -1.83 -0.62 -1.96 -1.13
−Pcedh CEDh, edh e∆ δ
s
h Lh 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.09
Total -0.51 -0.38 -0.76 -1.75 -0.48 -1.88 -1.04
Other income effects
∆ non-labor income 0.17 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.17
∆ cost of basic education 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Change in net income
∆ Y Hh -0.24 -0.16 -0.41 -0.83 -0.22 -0.89 -0.50
previously spent in school. The lost wage premium is slightly greater than the reduced
opportunity costs, such that the net effect is slightly negative.
Wage rates (VI): At the same time, wage rates themselves vary as a result of the change in
the skills mix of labor supply32. As we noted earlier, skilled wages increase by 3.30%,
whereas unskilled wages decline by 0.32%. Thus, the initial endowments of households
in these two types of labor determine the differential effect on incomes through this
channel.
32There are also general equilibrium demand effects on wage rates as consumption patterns adjust to the
subsidy cut and its impacts on the economy, but these are of much smaller magnitude.
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Cost of higher education (VII): The cost of higher education is affected in a number of
ways. The strongest impact is a reduction in net income through the subsidy cut itself
and the corresponding increase in the unit higher education costs (CED). Second, the
reduction in higher education investments, i.e. the reduction in δsh, directly reduces edu-
cation costs for households and thus increases net income. Finally, there is a very small
increase in the price of higher education through general equilibrium effects discussed
earlier, which reduces net income.
Non-labor income (VIII): Changes in household incomes and factor prices lead to small
general equilibrium increases in the returns to capital and to land. Indeed, in reaction
to the subsidy cuts, households reorient their consumption away from higher educa-
tion and increase their demande for capital-intensive industrial goods and land-intensive
agricultural goods.
Cost of basic education (IX): A final, minor, impact on household net incomes results from
changes in the cost of basic education. As the volume and unit cost of basic education
are assumed to be constant, this is purely the result of a reduction in the price of basic
education. Indeed, basic education is relatively intensive in unskilled labor, for which
the wage rate falls.
The combined impact of these various income effects is an average 0.50% reduction in net
income (see 2). Urban non-agricultural households lose by far the most, whereas agricultural
households, particularly in rural areas, lose least. To understand these impacts, we decompose
the contributions of the above-mentioned effects to the change in net income. To do so, we
express each of these effects as a share of initial income.
As we noted above, the shift toward unskilled labor is income-reducing for all household
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groups given that the wage premium for skilled workers more than offsets the opportunity cost
of the extra share of active life they must devote to higher education. In table 2, we see that
this channel accounts only for a small part of the decrease in average net income (0.04% =
0.13% - 0.09%). As we can see from the expression in equation 6, the skills mix effect is
strictly proportional to the absolute variation in skilled workers (∆δshLh), where the rest of the
expression (in square brackets) is identical for all household groups. Given the much higher
initial level of skilled workers in urban non-agricultural households (block E of table 1) – and
despite their slightly lower percentage variations (block F) – they have the largest absolute
change in skilled workers and thus have a slightly more negative skills mix effect than the
other household groups.
Overall, the wage effect is positive, leading to a 0.39% increase in net income. Indeed,
as the skilled wage rate increases (3.30%) much more than the unskilled wage rate declines
(0.32%), net income gains from the increase in the skilled wage rate (0.55%) more than offset
the losses (-0.16%) from the fall in the unskilled wage rate. Urban non-agricultural house-
holds, which have by far the highest share of skilled workers, benefit by far the most from this
increase in the skills premium, whereas agricultural households, particularly in rural areas,
benefit least.
The increase in the cost of higher education, which is mainly explained by the decrease in
subsidy, has by far the greatest impact, reducing household net incomes by 1.04%. This impact
is driven primarily by the direct impact of decreased subsidies, which reduces net incomes by
1.13%. On the other hand, the reduction in education investments leads to a decrease in the
expenditure on higher education and thus an increase in average net income of 0.09%. Finally,
the effect of the increase in the price of higher education is negligible. When we compare the
cost of higher education effect across household groups, we note that urban non-agricultural
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households are dramatically more negatively affected. This result can be traced to the fact
that it is urban non-agricultural households who have the highest shares of students and who,
consequently, are most directly hit by the subsidy cuts, which reduces their net income by
1.96%. In addition, these households have the smallest percentage reduction in students and
thus the smallest reduction in education investments.
The increase in non-labor income slightly offsets the impact of the increase in the cost of
higher education on net incomes. Whereas non-agricultural households – both rural and urban
– are the main beneficiaries of the increase in returns to capital, rural agricultural households
gain most from the increase in the returns to land (not shown). This leads to a positive impact
on net income through this channel of between 0.15% and 0.19% for all households.
The reduction in the price of basic education (0.32%) can be essentially traced to the 0.37%
reduction in the sales taxes, which we will examine more closely in the following section. This
impact is insignificant and varies little between household groups.
In conclusion, for all households, the direct impact of the subsidy cuts on the cost of higher
education far outstrip the compensating gains through higher skilled wage rates and non-labor
incomes. However, urban non-agricultural households are by far the biggest losers given their
high initial share of students and despite the fact that they benefit most from the increase in
the skill wage premium and non-labor incomes.
3.3 Welfare and poverty
As in many developing countries, poverty in Vietnam is principally a rural phenomenon and is
particularly problematic in agriculture. The poverty rate in rural areas is 45% compare to 9% in
urban areas (Vietnam’s Government-Donor-NGO, 1999)). In terms of income distribution, we
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observe a higher Gini index, and therefore a more unequal distribution of total consumption,
in urban areas (0.34) than in rural areas (0.27). Rural-urban divides in terms of education, as
well as even larger differences in education within urban areas, play an important role in this
respect. In this section, we explore the welfare and poverty impacts of the simulated cut in
public subsidies to higher education.
Consumer prices (X): In addition to the income channels we have been exploring so far, the
subsidy cut and the resulting shift in the economy’s skills mix and wage premium also
have general equilibrium effects on consumer prices. While we have already observed
the changes in the cost of education, all other consumer prices are also affected. These
results are primarily driven by the cost savings for government, which we assume to be
transformed into a reduction in sales taxes and, consequently, in consumer prices. Note
that cost savings come not only from the reduction in the rate of public subsidy, but
also from the reduction in the volume of students. Obviously, there are other possible
mechanisms through which government may adjust that would have different impacts
on poverty overall and by household category.
Our simulations indicate that government cost savings are transformed into a 0.37% reduction
in the sales tax rate (see Table 3), which is determined endogenously in order to keep the
government deficit constant. This leads to a reduction in consumer prices, which, in itself,
has a positive effect on welfare and poverty. Consumer prices reductions vary somewhat at
the sectoral level as a result of general equilibrium production cost and consumer demand
effects: 0.09% (services), 0.30% (agriculture) and 0.47% (industry). However, given that
consumption patterns differ little between household groups, they all experience a reduction
of roughly 0.37% in their non-education consumer price indices (CPI). Urban non-agricultural
households, which we have already found to have the most negative net income effects, also
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benefit least from these cost savings given the higher share of services in their consumption
basket.
We note that consumer prices fall more than net income for agricultural households (ru-
ral and urban), whereas the opposite is true for non-agricultural households, particularly in
rural areas. Consequently, we find quite strong contrasts in their welfare effects. Indeed,
we observe welfare gains for both agricultural household groups and welfare losses for their
non-agricultural counterparts. As agricultural households are a minority in urban areas and a
majority in rural areas, overall urban welfare falls whereas rural welfare increases. This result
also reflects the fact that the welfare gains of agricultural households are particularly strong
in urban areas, whereas the welfare losses of non-agricultural households are much greater
in rural areas. Finally, the fall in the welfare of non-agricultural households outweighs the
increase in the welfare of agricultural households such that welfare falls for the country as a
whole.
Table 3: Impacts on welfare and poverty
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Rural -0.37 -0.24 -0.37 0.12 -0.72 -0.52 -0.63 -0.06
Agricultural -0.37 -0.16 -0.38 0.20 -1.02 -0.63 -0.75
Non agricultural -0.37 -0.41 -0.37 -0.04 0.90 0.17 0.19
Urban -0.37 -0.83 -0.35 -0.35 1.41 1.61 2.07 -0.07
Agricultural -0.37 -0.22 -0.37 0.11 0.00 -0.62 -0.80
Non agricultural -0.37 -0.89 -0.35 -0.40 1.82 2.24 2.85
All -0.37 -0.50 -0.37 -0.08 0.29 0.39 0.45 -0.31
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We also find highly contrasting poverty impacts of the cut in public subsidies to higher ed-
ucation. A substantial 0.72% reduction in the share of poor among rural households contrast
with an even stronger 1.41% increase in the share of poor among urban households. Similarly
contrasting results are found for the poverty gap and severity indices. Among urban and ru-
ral households, agricultural households benefit from the policy change in poverty terms. In
contrast, there is a large increase in poverty among non agricultural households. Urban non-
agricultural households are particularly affected, with an increase in the incidence of poverty
of almost two percent. These results mirror the earlier welfare effects. Even though the poor
are overwhelmingly located in rural areas, the increase in poverty among urban non agricul-
tural households is sufficiently important to lead to an overall negative effect with poverty
increasing in
the country as a whole.33
Distribution of income is unchanged, by definition, within households groups as we are
in a representative household framework. Equality improves in both rural (0.06% reduction
in the Gini coefficient) and urban (0.07% reduction) areas. This reflects the fact that real
incomes increase for agricultural households, who have initially high poverty rates, and fall
for the less poor non-agricultural households. The reduction in inequality for the country as
33Note that choosing a different compensation mechanism can lead to different welfare and poverty results
without altering significantly the other main insights of the paper. For example, the choice of a compensatory
income tax instead of a compensatory sales tax increases welfare and reduces poverty for all households except
rural non-agricultural households. In effect, we observe a slightly more pronounced reduction in net gains,
mostly due to a somewhat greater rise in direct costs (because of the lesser fall in consumer prices, especially
for higher education). Households therefore invest less in higher education and the drop in skilled labor supply,
as well as the increase in unskilled labor supply, are more important. As a result, the skilled wage rate rises
less, the unskilled wage falls more and the increase in skills premium is similar. Mainly because the negative
unskilled wage effect exceeds the positive skilled wage effect for most households, the ”before tax“ income
decreases comparatively more than in the sales tax case. Yet, owing to the compensating fall in income tax rates,
all households (except rural non agricultural households) benefit from an increase in their disposable income and,
despite the lesser reduction in the CPI in the absence of the compensatory drop in sales tax rate, welfare therefore
increases and poverty decreases for all households (except rural non agricultural households).
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a whole (0.31%) is even greater, reflecting the fact that real incomes increase in the poorer,
rural, areas and fall in the richer, urban, areas.
4 Conclusion
As Vietnam’s government ponders further cuts to public spending on education, it has become
urgent to fully understand the implications for Vietnam’s economy, labor markets, income
distribution and poverty. This paper presents a static CGE model that fully integrates house-
hold education decisions and labor skill acquisition. Households consider both the (direct and
opportunity) costs and the benefits, in terms of higher wages, in determining their optimal in-
vestment in education and their optimal mix of skilled and unskilled labor. We use this model
to evaluate the impacts of a reduction in public subsidies to higher education, paying care-
ful attention to the numerous channels of impact. Simulation analysis presented in this work
highlights lessons on education-poverty links in general and, more specifically, in the case of
Vietnam.
The subsidy cut affect households through its impact on both incomes and consumer
prices. The immediate impact is to increase the private cost of higher education and, con-
sequently, reduced the net gains from investments in higher education. Our model confirms
this effect, although it shows that a general equilibrium increase in the skills premium cuts
the fall in net gains by more than half. Households react to falling net gains by reducing their
higher education investments and reweighting their optimal skills mix in favor of unskilled
workers, which is precisely the case of the increase in the wage premium paid to skilled work-
ers. Although the absolute reduction in net gains are the same for all household groups, rural
and agricultural households have the greatest
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percentage reduction in net gains given their low initial levels (due to observed higher costs
of education). As a result of this and their low initial share of skilled labor, they also have the
largest percentage reduction in skilled labor.
Our results also show that the subsidy cut has strong and complex impacts on household
incomes. Overall, household incomes fall by 0.5%. This is primarily a result of the increase
in the costs of higher education, which reduces household net-of-education-costs income by
more than one percent, despite the reduction in the absolute number of students sent for higher
education. This income loss is reinforced by the direct loss of income from having a lower
share of skilled workers, who earn a skills premium during their working life, although this
is almost entirely offset by the additional income these workers earn during the period they
would have previously been attending school. Another important income effect comes through
changes in wage rates. Here, the impact of the increase in skilled wages is found to be suffi-
cient to offset the loss due to the fall in unskilled wages, such that the net effect is an average
0.39% increase in household income. An increase in non-labor income also serves to cushion
the increased costs of education, increasing income by 0.17% on average. Changes in the
price of education are found to play only a negligible role.
When we compare across households, it is clearly the urban non-agricultural households
that are hardest hit by the direct increase in the private costs of higher education, given their
much higher share of students. While this negative impact is partially offset by larger gains
from the increase in the skills premium and non-labor income for these households, it is not
enough as their incomes fall by 0.89%, as compared to 0.41% for rural non-agricultural house-
holds and roughly 0.20% for agricultural households in both rural and urban areas. Further-
more, urban non-agricultural households benefit least from the fall in consumer prices as the
government transforms subsidy cuts into lower indirect taxes, although the differences here
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are minor.
Combining these income and consumer price effects, non-agricultural households experi-
ence a welfare loss and increase in poverty, particularly in urban areas, whereas agricultural
households emerge as winners in welfare and poverty terms. At the same time this pro-rural
pro-agricultural bias of subsidy cuts reduces inequality within and between the urban and rural
regions. The negative impacts on urban non-agricultural households are sufficiently great that
welfare falls and poverty increases for Vietnam as a whole.
We conclude that a cut in public subsidies to higher education in Vietnam would reduce
the share of skilled labor, increase the skills wage premium, reduce welfare and increase
poverty. While rural and agricultural households would benefit from this reform, urban and
non-agricultural households would lose out.
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5 Annexe 1: Complete Mathematical Description
5.1 Symbols
5.1.1 Indices
5.1.1 Indices
Production
AGR Agriculture
IND Industry
SER Services
EDB Basic education
EDS Higher education
Households
RF Rural agricultural
RNF Rural non agricultural
UF Urban agricultural
UW Urban non agricultural
Sets
I Production sectors: AGR, IND, SER,EDB,EDS
AGRS(I) Agricultural sector: AGR
NAG(I) Non agricultural sectors: IND, SER,EDB,EDS
SERV (I) Services sectors: SER,EDB,EDS
GOOD(I) Goods sectors: AGR, IND
NED(I) Non educational sectors: AGR, IND, SER
H Households: RF,RNF,UF, UNF
5.1.2 Parameters
alli Scale parameter (CES between skilled and unskilled labor)
αlli Share parameter (CES between skilled and unskilled labor)
δlli Elasticity of substitution (CES between skilled and unskilled labor)
ρlli Substitution parameter (CES between skilled and unskilled labor)
akli Scale parameter (CES between labor and capital)
αkli Share parameter (CES between labor and capital)
δkli Elasticity of substitution (CES between labor and capital)
ρkli Substitution parameter (CES between labor and capital)
acl Scale parameter (CES between composite factor and land)
αcl Share parameter (CES between composite factor and land)
δcl Elasticity of substitution (CES between composite factor and land)
ρcl Substitution parameter (CES between composite factor and land)
ioi Coefficient (Leontief for total intermediate consumption)
vi Coefficient (Leontief for value added)
aijj,i Coefficient Input output
γh,ned Marginal share of good NED in the demand function of household h
ηh,ned Income elasticity of good NED for household h
$h,ned Minimum consumption of good NED (demand function) of household h
ζh Frish parameter (demand function) of household h
φh Marginal propensity to save of household h
λlh Share of land income received by household h
λlf Share of land income received by firms
λlrow Share of land income received by the rest of the world
λrh Share of capital income received by household h
λrf Share of capital income received by firms
λrrow Share of capital income received by the rest of the world
blh Scale parameter (CET between skilled and unskilled labor)
βlh Share parameter (CET between skilled and unskilled labor)
τ l Elasticity of transformation (CET between skilled and unskilled labor)
κl Transformation parameter (CET between skilled and unskilled labor)
tmi Import tax rate for product i
txi Sales tax rate for product i
tpxi Production tax rate for product i
tfk Capital tax rate
tf l Land tax rate
tyhh Income tax rate for household h
tyf Direct income tax rate for firms
bei Scale parameter (CET between exports and domestic sales)
βei Share parameter (CET between exports and domestic sales)
τ ei Elasticity of transformation (CET between exports and domestic sales)
κei Transformation parameter (CET between exports and domestic sales)
ami Scale parameter (CES between imports and local product)
αmi Share parameter (CES between imports and local product)
δmi Elasticity of substitution (CES between imports and local product)
ρmi Substitution parameter (CES between imports and local product)
µi Value share of good i in total investment
ιserv Consumption share of service serv in total public consumption
δi Share of sector i in total value added
dvr Share of firms’ income distributed in dividends to the rest of the world
e Share of a worker’s active life time that must be spent in higher education in order to
become skilled
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5.1.3 Endogenous variables
Ws Skilled wage index
Wu Unskilled wage index
Wli Composite labor wage index
Rki Return index for capital in sector i
Rl Return index for land
Rc Return index for composite capital
Pi Production price of product i
P ti Production price of product i including taxes
Pvi Value added price in sector i
Pdi Domestic sales price of product i including taxes
Pli Domestic sales price of product i excluding taxes
Pci Consumption price of product i
Pmi Domestic price of imports i
Pei Domestic price of exports i
P index General price index
Pinv Investment price index
Pg Governmental consumption price index
XSi Production in sector i
V Ai Value added in sector i (volume)
DIi,j Intermediate consumption of product i by sector j
CIj Total intermediate consumption by sector i
LDUi Demand for unskilled labor by sector i
LDSi Demand for skilled labor by sector i
CLi Composite labor in sector i
CF Composite production factor (capital-land) in the agricultural sector
LAh Volume of active labor in household h
LEh Volume of student in household h
LUh Volume of unskilled labor in household h
LSAh Volume of active skilled labor in household h
LSPh Volume of potential skilled labor in household h
δsh Share of skilled workers in household h’s total potential labor supply
Cned,h Consumption of good ned by households h (volume)
CTHh Total consumption of households h (value)
INVi Investment in product h (volume)
IT Total investment (value)
DITi Intermediate demand for product i
Gedh Public consumption in higher education (volume)
CTG Total public consumption (value)
CTGvol Total public consumption (volume)
Di Demand for local product i
Qi Demand for composite product i
EDedh Higher education demand by household h
STUDedh Higher education demand by households and government
Mi Imports of product i
EXi Exports of product i
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Y Hh Income of household h
Y DHh Disposable of household h
Y F Firms income
Y G Government income
SHh Savings of household h
SF Firms savings
DIV ROW Dividends and other capital income received by the rest of the world
TIi Indirect tax income
TIMi Imports tax income
TIEi Exports tax income
TCAP Capital tax income
TLAND Land tax income
DTHh Tax income from direct income tax for household h
DTF Tax income from direct firms income tax
NU Adjustment variable for firms saving
ADJ Adjustment variable for sales tax
EVh Equivalent variation of household h
LEON Verification variable for Walras’s law
Ω Objective variable
5.1.4 Exogenous variables
Lh Total adjusted labor volume of household h
KS Capital volume
SG Current deficit (public savings)
Gedb Public consumption of basic education (volume)
Gser Public consumption of services (volume)
EDedb,h Demand for basic education of household h
TEDh,edh Public subsidy in higher education for household h
CEDT h,edh Total direct unit cost of higher education for household h
CEDh,edh Direct unit cost of higher education supported by household h
LAND Land demanded by the agricultural sector
ITV OL Total investment (volume)
Pwmi Rest of the world import price for product i (foreign currency)
Pwei Rest of the world export price for product i (foreign currency)
Er Nominal exchange rate
CAB Current account balance (foreign trade)
DIV h Dividends and other capital income received by household h
TGh Government transfers to household h
TGF Government transfers to firms
TROW h Transfers from ROW to household h
TFROW Transfers from ROW to firms
TGROW Transfers from ROW to the government
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5.2 Equations
5.2.1 Production
Sector i production function
XSi = V Ai/vi
Value added in non agricultural sectors
V Anag = a
kl
nag
{[
αklnagCL
−ρklnag
nag
]
+
[
(1− αklnag)KD
−ρklnag
nag
]}−1/ρklnag
Value added in the agricultural sector
V Aagr = a
cl
{[
αclCF−ρ
cl
]
+
[
(1− αcl)LAND
−ρcl
]}−1/ρcl
Composite production factor (labor-capital) in the agricultural sector
CF = aklagr
{[
αklagrCL
−ρklagr
agr
]
+
[
(1− αklagr)KD
−ρklagr
agr
]}−1/ρklagr
Total intermediate consumption of sector i
CIi = ioiXSi
Intermediate demand for product i by sector j
DIi,j = aiji,jCIi
Demand for land by the agricultural sector
LAND =
{[
(1− αcl)Rc
]
/
[
αclRl
]}δcl
CF
5.2.2 Labor Demand
Composite labor
CLi = a
ll
{[
αlli LDNQ
−ρll
i
]
+
[
(1− αll)LDQ) −ρ
ll
i
]}−1/ρll
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Demand for composite labor in non agricultural sectors
CLnag = (a
kl
nag)
(αklnag−1)
{[
(αklnagPvnag)/Wlnag
]σkl}
V Anag
Demand for composite labor in the agricultural sector
CLagr = (a
kl
agr)
(αklagr−1)
{[
(αklagrPvagr)/Wlagr
]σkl}
CF
Demand for unskilled labor
LDNQi =
{[
αlli /(1− α
ll
i )
]σll
i
[
Ws/Wu
]σll
i
}
LDQi
5.2.3 Labor Supply
Choice function of higher education by household h
LSPh =
{[
Ws (1− e)− CEDh,edh Pcedh e
]τ l[
βl/(1− βl)
]τ l}
Transformation of unskilled into skilled labor (and vice-versa)
δnqh = 1− δ
s
h
Active (composite) labor supply by household h
LAh = δ
nq
h Lh + δ
s
h(1− e)Lh
Unskilled labor supply by household h
LUh = δ
nq
h Lh
Volume of potential skilled labor of household h
LSPh = δ
s
hLh
Active skilled labor supply by household h
LSAh = δ
s
h(1− e)Lh
Volume of student in household h
LEh = Lh − LAh
Unit cost of higher education “consumed” by household h
CEDh, edh = CEDT h, edh − TEDh, edh
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5.2.4 Income and Savings
Income of household h (net of investment in higher education)
Y Hh = Wu δ
nq
h Lh +Ws (1− e) δ
s
h Lh − CEDh, edh PCedh eδ
s
h Lh
+ λrh
∑
i
Rki KDi + λ
l
h Rl LAND +DIV h + Pindex TGh
+ Er TROW h − EDh, edb PCedb (7)
Disposable income of household h
Y DHh = Y Hh −DTHh
Firms income
Y F = [1− tfk −
∑
h
λrh]
∑
i
Rki KDi+ Er TFROW + Pindex TGF
Government income
Y G =
∑
i
TIi +
∑
h
DTHh +
∑
i
TPi +
∑
i
TIMi +DTF + Er TGROW
+ TCAP + TLAND + ADJ
∑
i
(PdiDi + PmiMi)
Household h’s savings
SHh = φhY DHh
Firms’ savings
SF = Y F −
∑
h
DIV h −DTF − Er DIV ROW
Dividends distributed by firms to ROW
DIV ROW = NU dvr Y F
Government’s savings
SG = Y G− CTG−
∑
h
Pindex TGh − Pindex TGF
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5.2.5 Taxes
Indirect tax income for product i
T Ii = txi(Pi XSi − Pei EXi) + txi(1 + tmi)Er PwmiMi
Production tax income from sector i
TPi = tpxi Pti XSi
Import tax income from sector i
T IMi = tmi Er Pwmi Mi
Capital tax income
TCAP = tfk
∑
i
Rk KDi
Land tax income
TLAND = tf l Rl LAND
Income from direct households h’s income tax
DTHh = tyhh Y Hh
Income from direct firms’ income tax
DTF = tyh Y F
5.2.6 Demands
Total consumption of household h
CTHh = Y DHh − SHh
Consumption of composite good ned of household h
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Cned, h Pcned = $ned, hPcned + γned,h[CTHh −
∑
ned
$ned,hPcned]
Higher education “consumption” (volume) of household h
EDedh,h = CEDedh, hLEh
Higher education “consumption” (volume) of the government
Gedh =
∑
h
TEDedh, h LEh
Demand for higher education by households and the government
STUDedh =
∑
h
EDedh,h +Gedh
Total public consumption (value)
CTG =
∑
serv
Gserv Pcserv
Total public consumption (volume)
CTGV OL = CTG/Pg
Investment in the composite good i
INVi = µi Pci IT
Total investment (volume)
ITV OL = IT/P inv
Intermediate demand for composite good j by sector i
DITi =
∑
j
DIi,j
5.2.7 Prices
Value added price in sector i
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Pvi =
[
PiXSi −
∑
j
PcjDIi,j
]
/V Ai
Return rate index of capital in non agricultural sectors
Rknag =
[
PvnagV Anag −WlnagCLnag
]
/KDnag
Return rate index of capital in the agricultural sector
Rkagr =
[
Rc CF −WlagrCLagr
]
/KDagr
Mean return rate index of the composite production factor in the agricultural sector
Rc =
[
PvagrV Aagr −Rl LAND
]
/CF
Mean wage index for composite labor in sector i
Wli =
[
Wu LDNQi +Ws LDQi
]
/CLi
Domestic price (including taxes) of product i
Pdi = Pli (1 + txi)
Local price for imports i
Pmi = (1 + txi)(1 + tmi)Er Pwmi
Local price for exports i
Pei = Er Pwei
Consumption price of composite good i
P ci =
{
(1 + adj)[PdiDi + PmiMi]
}
/Qi
Production price of sector i
Pi = [PliDi + PeiEXi]/XSi
Production price of sector i (including taxes)
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Pti = Pi/(1 + tpxi)
Investment price index
Pinv =
∏
good
(Pcgood/µgood)
µgood
Public consumption price index
Pg =
∑
serv
Pcserv cgserv
General price index
Pindex =
∑
i
Pvi δi
5.2.8 International Trade
Relation between domestic sales (D) and exports (EX)
XSi = B
e
i
{[
βeiEX
κe
i
i
]
+
[
(1− βei )D
κe
i
i
]}1/κei
Export supply of sector i
EXi = (Pei/P li)
τe
i
[
(1− βei )/β
e
i
]τe
i
Di
Relation between imports and local production
Qi = A
m
i
{[
αmi M
−ρm
i
i
]
+
[
(1− αmi )D
−ρm
i
i
]}−1/ρmi
Imports demand for product i
Mi = (Pdi/Pmi)
σm
i
[
(1− αmi )/α
m
i
]σm
i
Di
Current account balance
CAB =
∑
i
Pwmi Mi +DIV ROW −
∑
i
Pwei EXi −
∑
h
TRHh
−TFROW − TGROW
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5.2.9 Equilibrium and Closures
Domestic absorption (goods)
Qgood =
∑
h
Cgood,h +DITgood + INVgood
Domestic absorption (higher education)
Qedh = DITedh + STUDedh
Domestic absorption (basic education)
Qedb = DITedb +
∑
h
EDedb,h +Gedb
Unskilled labor market equilibrium∑
h
LUh =
∑
i
LDNQi
Skilled labor market equilibrium∑
h
LSAh =
∑
i
LDQi
Investment-Savings equilibrium
IT =
∑
h
SHh + SF + Pindex SG+ Er CAB
5.2.10 Other
Equivalent variation (using the composite good providing utility)
EVh =
[∏
ned
(Pconed/Pcned)
]γned, h[
CTHh −
∑
ned
$ned, hPcned
]
[
CTHOh −
∑
ned
$ned, hPconed
]
Verification of Walras’ law
LEON = Qser −
∑
h
Cser, h −DITser −Gser
Objective function
OMEGA = 1000
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